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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the District Court commit plain error by allowing extensive

testimony regarding a subsequent bad act consisting of an alleged incident in a hot tub that was
the subject of a count that was dismissed at the preliminary hearing, in violation of Rule
404(b) and Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence without making any findings that (1) there
was a necessity for evidence of the subsequent act, (2) the subsequent act was highly probative
of a material issue of the crime charged, and (3) its special probativeness and the necessity for
it outweighed its prejudicial effect? Under the plain error standard, the appellate court will
reverse if an error exists, the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and the error
is harmful. State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). An appellate court will
examine a trial court's decision under Rule 404(b) with very limited deference, according it a
relatively small degree of discretion. State v. Doporto. 935 P.2d 484, 489 (Utah 1997).
There is no reference in the record of any objection to the introduction of the subsequent bad
act evidence.
2.

Was the defendant deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective

assistance of counsel by reason of his attorney's failure to investigate and present evidence of
a transcript of a television program that Sarah Call watched that prompted her disclosure of
the alleged abuse? This issue was raised below in a post-trial motion that was denied by the
trial court. (R. 505-649, 1824). A court will reverse for ineffective assistance of counsel
where the defendant can show that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (citing
1

Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)). In a situation
where the trial court has previously heard a motion based on ineffective assistance of counsel,
the reviewing court is free to make an independent determination of the trial court's
conclusions. However, the factual findings of the trial court shall not be set aside on appeal
unless clearly erroneous. Templin. 805 P.2d at 186.
3.

Was there prosecutorial misconduct by the state in its closing argument

by arguing matters not in evidence or contradicted by the evidence and by referring to the fact
that the defendant failed to call his son as a witness? An appellate court will reverse for
prosecutorial misconduct if the actions or remarks of the prosecutor call the jury's attention to
a matter it would not be justified in considering in determining its verdict and under the
circumstances of the case, the error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a
reasonable likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result.
State v. Tennev, 913 P.2d 750, 754-55 (Utah Ct. App.) (citations omitted), cert, denied. 923
P.2d 693 (Utah 1996). Defendant's counsel objected to a reference to the consistency of
Sarah's testimony with a videotape that was not in evidence (R. 1325-26) and to the reference
to the failure of the defendant to call his son as a witness (R. 1361). There is no record of
any objection to the misstatement of evidence by the prosecutor. However, these remarks may
be reviewed by the appellate court despite the lack of objection under the plain error standard.
State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 342 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993).
4. Was the defendant deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel by reason of his attorney's failure to object to the improper remarks of
the prosecutor during closing argument and to the introduction of evidence of the subsequent
hot tub incident? This issue was not raised before the trial court. The appellate court will
consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on direct
2

appeal. State v. Tennvson. 850 P.2d 461, 466 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In so doing, the
appellate court must decide whether defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of
counsel as a matter of law, applying the Strickland standard set forth above. Id.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES
Rule 404. Utah Rules of Evidence: Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct,
exceptions: other crimes
(b)

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.

Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence: Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice,
confusion, or waste of time
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a conviction in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt

Lake County in which a jury found the defendant guilty of sexual abuse of a child, a seconddegree felony. Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one but not
to exceed fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. Defendant is presently incarcerated.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Trial Court
On or about April 15, 1994, the Defendant/Appellant Scott Logan GoUaher

(sometimes referred to as "GoUaher") was charged by Information with three counts of sexual
abuse of a child, in violation of U.C.A. § 75-5-404.1. (R. 13). Count I consisted of an
allegation that GoUaher had touched Sarah Call in the genital area while she was sleeping on a
3

trampoline during July 1993. (R. 13). Count II consisted of an allegation that Gollaher had
touched Sarah Call in the genital area with his foot while she was in a hut tub on
December 31, 1993. (R. 13-14). Count III consisted of an allegation that Gollaher had
touched Amy Call in the genital area in June 1993. (R. 14).
On June 23, 1995, a preliminary hearing was held. (R. 731). After the
preliminary hearing, the District Court dismissed Count II. (R. 72). A trial by jury was held
on February 21-23, 1996. On February 23, 1996, the jury found Gollaher guilty of the first
count with regard to Sarah Call and the trampoline incident. (R. 1378). The jury found
Gollaher not guilty with regard to the remaining count involving Amy Call. (Id.).
Gollaher's trial counsel subsequently filed a motion for a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence, arguing that trial counsel had just discovered the transcript of the
television program that Sarah Call watched that prompted the disclosure of the touching, which
transcript was strikingly similar to Sarah Call's trial testimony in many important respects.
(R. 253-306). Gollaher's trial counsel subsequently withdrew and Gollaher retained new
counsel to represent him in the case. (R. 307-313). Gollaher's new counsel determined that
the transcript could and should have been discovered by trial counsel prior to trial and that
trial counsel had simply not conducted any investigation to obtain the transcript. (R. 510).
Therefore new counsel moved to withdraw the motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence and to replace it with a motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of
counsel. (R. 502-03, 505-649). The motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of counsel
was also based on trial counsel's failure to properly investigate evidence of witness
suggestibility and post-event memory contamination prior to trial. (R. 505-649). Gollaher
also filed a motion to arrest judgment. (R. 505-649). The District Court denied both the
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motion to arrest judgment and the motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of counsel.
(R. 701, 1824, 1904).
On August 15, 1996, the Court imposed sentence of one to fifteen years.
(R. 1889).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The issues in this appeal require an evaluation of the harmfulness of the legal
errors and ineffective assistance of counsel occurring during the trial of this matter. An
evaluation of "harmfulness" requires a basic knowledge of the weakness of the prosecution's
case and the effect that the erroneous admission of bad act evidence, the misconduct of the
prosecutor during closing argument, and the ineffective assistance of counsel, could have had
on the jury's verdict.
PROSECUTION'S CASE
Sarah Call was the prosecution's only witness to the incident that was the
subject of the conviction. (R. 864-1157). There was a total absence of any physical proof
that the offense occurred. (R. 864-1157). The prosecution's entire proof consisted of 13
year-old Sarah Call's testimony about an event that lasted for a few seconds on a trampoline
when she was 10 years old and while she was coming out of a state of sleep. (R. 864-1157,
764, 895-96, 937).
WITNESS-SARAH CALL (Direct): Sarah Call testified that she had gone to
GoUaher's house in the summer of 1993 to sleep over so that she could babysit GoUaher's son
Peter the next morning, as Gollaher was to leave the house early that next morning and
GoUaher's wife was out of town. (R. 921-24).
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Arrangements were made for Sarah Call, Peter GoUaher, and Scott GoUaher to
sleep outside on the trampoline. (R. 925-26). Sarah Call had slept outside on the Gollaher's
trampoline before. (R. 925).
Sarah Call put on a t-shirt for pajamas. (R. 926-27). GoUaher asked Sarah
Call if she wanted to go to the hot tub. Sarah said yes. Sarah thought that Peter was asleep at
the time. (R. 929). GoUaher playfully threw Sarah into the hot tub. (R. 930). GoUaher said
that Sarah's panties were wet and that she should take them off so that he could hang them up
to dry. (R. 931).
Sarah stayed in the hot tub for a period of time, and then got out of the hut tub
and went into the bathroom in Gollaher's house where she put on a new, dry night shirt.
(R. 932, 935). Sarah did not have an extra pair of underpants and did not ask for another
pair. (R:935-36). GoUaher did not get into the hot tub with Sarah. (R. 932-33). GoUaher
did not go into the bathroom with her while she changed into a dry night shirt. (R. 935).
After changing into a dry night shirt, Sarah went back to the trampoline to go to
sleep. (R. 932, 935). GoUaher asked Sarah to sleep on the trampoline with her feet by his
head. (R. 936). Sarah fell asleep. (R. 937). Sarah was awakened when she felt Gollaher's
finger touching her "private." (R. 937). Sarah testified that she did not remember how long
GoUaher touched her. (R. 939). GoUaher only rubbed Sarah's "private" one time, "up and
down/ (R. 962). After the touching, Sarah began moving around on the trampoline and
GoUaher moved her back. (R. 938). Sarah got up from the trampoline, put her panties back
on, returned to the same spot on the trampoline, and went to sleep. (R. 939-41). Sarah
testified that she "tried to stay away" from Gollaher's house after the trampoline incident.
(R. 968).
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Sarah originally thought that touching incident had been a dream. (R. 969). At
the preliminary hearing, Sarah stated that she had thought that the touching incident had been a
dream. (R. 969). At trial, Sarah testified that she no longer thought that the touching incident
was a dream. (R. 969).
Sarah Call's first disclosure of the trampoline incident took place approximately
six months after it occurred and was triggered by watching a girl on a television show who
said something happened to her. (R. 918).
CROSS EXAMINATION: Scott and Peter GoUaher slept on the trampoline
frequently. (R. 1005). It was not unusual for Sarah and other neighborhood kids to sleep on
Gollaher's trampoline. (R. 1006).
Sarah admitted that when people move on the trampoline, it moves everyone
else and that moving would wake other people sleeping on the trampoline. (R. 1008-09).
Despite the fact that Sarah testified that she was moving around on the trampoline at the time
of the touching, Peter did not roll into her and did not wake up. (R. 1007).
Sarah had not been asked by the defense at the preliminary hearing whether she
had dreamed up the trampoline incident. Rather, Sarah volunteered that she thought it was
dream. (R. 976). When Sarah disclosed the touching incident to her mother, Sarah told her
mother that she did not know whether it happened or whether she was dreaming. (R. 1021).
By Sarah's own reckoning, she was at the Gollaher residence a minimum of six
times after the trampoline incident without any apparent concern, belying her statement that
she "tried to stay away" from Gollaher. These visits included an overnight trip with her dad,
her sister Amy Call, Peter Gollaher, and Scott Gollaher to Lehman Caves in which she did not
say anything to her dad about not wanting to go on the trip with Gollaher (R. 986-87); visits
to the Gollaher home to see Sarah Gollaher (R. 977-78); visits to see Peter Gollaher (R. 978);
7

visits to play with neighborhood friends (R. 978); a visit when the Fotheringham family was
present (R. 981); a visit to babysit Peter Gollaher (R. 1016-17); and a visit on New Year's
Eve (R. 904-05).
DEFENDANT'S CASE
WITNESS-SCOTT GOLLAHER (Direct): Sarah frequently went to
Gollaher's home during 1993, visiting the play area as many as 40 times and the home as
many as 20 times. (R. 1243). Other neighborhood children would also come to the home to
play. (R. 1244). It was a common practice for neighborhood children to sleep on the
Gollaher's trampoline. (R. 1246). The Gollahers had a rule that children could not play in
the play area without adult supervision and could not sleep out on the trampoline without a
parent with them. (R. 1246). When sleeping on the trampoline, Gollaher would arrange the
adults and children on the trampoline so as to avoid people rolling toward the middle of the
trampoline. (R. 1251).
Gollaher recalls sleeping on the trampoline one night with his son Peter and
Sarah Call after Sarah's father, Alan Call, left the Gollaher home. (R. 1254-56). Sarah's
father, Alan Call, was going to come back over to the home and get into the hot tub. (R.
1256). While Sarah and Gollaher were waiting by the hot tub for Alan Call to return,
Gollaher jokingly pushed Sarah into the hot tub. (R. 1256). Sarah's father never returned to
the Gollaher home to use the hot tub. (R. 1257).
Eventually, Gollaher gave Sarah a change of clothes and told her to change.
(R. 1258). After Sarah changed her clothes, Sarah and Gollaher went to the trampoline.
Gollaher's son Peter was already on the trampoline. (R. 1258-59). Gollaher positioned
himself, Peter, and Sarah in kind of a triangle so that the children would not sink into him.
(R. 1259).
8

GoUaher did not touch Sarah between the legs while they were on the
trampoline. (R. 1260). GoUaher did not inappropriately and intentionally touch Sarah Call to
arouse or gratify his sexual desires or to harm her in any way. (R. 1233).
CROSS-EXAMINATION: Sarah came over to Gollaher's home with her
father at about 8:00 p.m. or 8:30 p.m. on July 9, 1993 (R. 1277-78). GoUaher and Sarah's
father talked until 9:00 p.m. or 10:00 p.m. that night at which time Sarah's father left to go
home, indicating that he was going to come back over and use the hot tub with GoUaher and
Sarah. (R. 1279, 1281).
GoUaher pushed Sarah into the hot tub. (R. 1286). Sarah said she forgot to
take off her underwear. GoUaher said if she wanted him to, he would wring them out and put
them on the barbecue to dry. (R. 1286).
Sarah was sleeping in a sleeping bag on the trampoline. (R. 1292). GoUaher
was sleeping with blankets. (R. 1292). If GoUaher did touch Sarah, it was not a conscious
act and was done while he was asleep. (R. 1292).
OTHER TESTIMONY: Bart Fotheringham, a neighbor of Scott GoUaher, saw
Sarah Call at the GoUaher residence over ten times from the summer of 1993 through January
1994. (R. 1186-87). Shauna Fotheringham, also neighbor of Scott GoUaher, saw Sarah Call
at the GoUaher residence ten or twenty times at the GoUaher residence from June 1, 1993 to
December 31, 1993. (R. 1107). Sarah GoUaher, the wife of Scott GoUaher, saw Sarah Call
at the GoUaher residence an average of two or three times a week from June 1, 1993 to
December 31, 1993. (R. 1218). Sarah GoUaher did not notice any difference in the way
Sarah acted around Scott GoUaher after the alleged trampoline incident. (R. 1221).
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FACTS RELEVANT TO SPECIFIC ISSUES ON APPEAL
The following Statement of Facts is organized by the facts relevant to each of
the issues on appeal.
Issue 1:

Did the District Court commit plain error by allowing extensive testimony
regarding a subsequent alleged incident in a hot tub that was the subject of a
count that was dismissed at the preliminary hearing, in violation of Rule 404(b)
and Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence?
On or about April 15, 1994, GoUaher was charged by Information with three

counts of sexual abuse of a child, in violation of U.C.A. § 75-5-404.1. (R. 13). Count II
consisted of an allegation that GoUaher had touched Sarah Call in the genital area with his foot
while she was in a hot tub on December 31, 1993. (R. 13-14).
On June 23, 1995, a preliminary hearing was held. (R. 731). At the
preliminary hearing, Sarah Call testified that the touching in the hot tub could have been
accidental. (R. 801). After the preliminary hearing, the District Court dismissed Count II
because Sarah Call testified that the touching could have been accidental. (R. 72, R. 1832).
At trial, the state introduced evidence of the hot tub incident, despite the fact
that it had been dismissed after the preliminary hearing. (R. 904-923). The state's reference
to the hot tub incident included a detailed explanation of where Sarah Call and GoUaher were
located in the hot tub and the following dialogue:
Q.

(By Mr. Cope) Did anything unusual happen while
you were in the hot tub?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What was it that happened that you thought was
unusual?

A.

Scott put his feet between my legs.

Q.

And how long were his feet between your legs?
10

A.

I don't know.

Q.

Were you able to feel anything or you just thought
that?

A.

I felt it.

Q.

What part of your body did you feel it with?

A.

My private.

(R. 913-14).
The state subsequently made repeated references to the hot tub incident.
Q.

Well, you thought you got touched in the hot tub,
right?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. Did you think about doing anything because
of what happened in the hot tub?

A.

No.

Q.

Okay. Did anybody ever, after this day, ask you
any questions about this? The hot tub, I mean.

A.

No.

Q.

So have I ever asked you any questions about this?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did I ask you some questions just now about the
hot tub?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. That's what you just told us, about the hot
tub stuff.

A.

Yes.

(R. 915).

(R. 916).
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Q.

Okay. Was that the same year you said—

A.

Yes.

Q.

That the hot tub incident happened? You told your
mom the same year?

A.

Yes.

Q.

So you told your mom about the hot tub?

A.

Yes.

Q.

You said you thought Scott had touched you with
his foot~

A.

Yes.

Q.

When you were going to go babysitting. So that
wasn't the hot tub thing?

A.

No.

Q.

So you told her about that one first; is that right?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay. Now, have you told us about that one yet?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay, is that what you just told us about? I'm
confiised. Can you help me? I know about a hot
tub because you just told us all about that.

Q.

We already talked about the hot tub, now we are
going to talk about something different, right?

A.

Yes.

(R. 920).

(R. 921).

(R. 921-22).

(R. 923).
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Q.

Okay. Thank you. Now, during the preliminary
hearing, Mr. Yengich asked you some questions
about how long on New Year's day Mr. GoUaher's
foot was in your private part. Do you remember
that?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you remember what you told him?

A.

Six seconds.

Q.

Do you still think that is an accurate assessment of
how long that was?

A.

Yes.

Q.

(By Mr. Cope) One more question. When you
said it was about six seconds for the foot, right?

A.

Yes.

(R. 969).

(R. 970).
In closing argument, the state then misstates the evidence on two separate
occasions, attributing the time period of the touching in the hot tub incident (the subject of the
dismissed count) to the time period of the touching in the trampoline incident.
She says she is awakened by his hand in her vaginal area, rubbing
six to nine seconds.
(R. 1323).
The touching that was described as prolonged. It was six to nine
seconds, if you put the evidence together. The touching was skin
to skin.
(R. 1316).
In fact, Sarah testified that it was the New Year's Eve hot tub incident that
lasted six seconds. (R. 970). Sarah testified that she did not remember how long GoUaher
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touched her on the trampoline. (R. 939). She further testified that the touching on the
trampoline occurred one time, "up and down." (R. 962).
The state again refers to the hot tub incident in its closing argument.
She carries that around with her for nine months, until something
galvanizes her into thinking that she can't avoid this any more.
And that's the incident in the hot tub, again, on or about New
Year's Day.
(R. 1323).
In fact, Sarah testified that it was the viewing of the television program that
prompted her to disclose the allegations, not the hot tub incident. (R. 918).
There is no record of any objection by defendant's trial counsel to the
introduction of the subsequent bad act of the defendant (although a bench conference was
requested by the defendant's trial counsel and granted at the time the "bad act evidence" was
first introduced. However, no record of the bench conference was made). (R. 910). With
regard to the evidence of the subsequent bad act, the Court instructed the jury as follows in
jury instruction no. 18:
You are instructed that the evidence that the defendant touched
Sarah Call in the hot tub on or about January 1, 1994, was
offered only to set the time frame for when the allegations were
made in this case. The court instructs you that you are not to
take that incident into consideration in any way in determining the
guilt of the defendant.
(R. 164).
Counsel for the defendant objected to jury instruction no. 18, requesting that the
court add the following instruction:
Moreover, the court instructs you that the charge against the
defendant was dismissed at the preliminary hearing.
(R. 140, 1376).
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The court refused to add the requested language. (R. 140).
It was undisputed that Sarah Call first made the allegations concerning the
trampoline incident to her mother, Liz Call, not in connection with anything that happened on
December 31, 1993, but in connection with and immediately after Sarah watched a television
program in late January 1994. (R. 918). The next day, Mrs. Call spoke with her bishop
concerning the allegations. (R. 869). The bishop indicated he would contact the authorities.
(R. 877). The allegations came to the attention of Mitchell Clark, a supervisor for the
Division of Family Services, on February 1, 1994. (R. 1149). In opening statements, both
the state and the defendant indicated that there was no dispute as to when the allegations were
made. (R. 838, 855-56).
Issuej2:

Was the defendant deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel by reason of his attorney's failure to investigate and present evidence
of a transcript of a television program that Sarah Call watched that prompted
her disclosure of the alleged abuse?
Sarah Call's first disclosure of the trampoline incident took place six months

after it occurred and was triggered by watching a girl on a television program who said
something happened to her. (R. 917-18). During the police interview on March 9, 1994,
Sarah stated that she had viewed the television program four or five weeks before the police
interview. (R. 570). This would place the television program at the end of January or the
beginning of February 1994. This time period was confirmed by Sarah's testimony at the
preliminary hearing, when she stated that she spoke to her mother immediately after she
viewed the television program. (R. 781). The next day Mr. and Mrs. Call went to speak
with their bishop. (R. 870-72). By February 1, 1994, the Division of Family Services had
been contacted concerning the incident. (R. 1148.) By February 3, 1994, the Division of
Family Services had notified the Salt Lake County Sheriff of the allegations. (See Initial
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Report Form (R. 586)). Thus, given all of the available information, it was apparent that the
television program must have occurred several days prior to February 1, 1994.
The defendant specifically requested that his trial counsel investigate the date of
the television program watched by Sarah Call and obtain a transcript. (R. 633). When trial
counsel failed to comply with the defendant's request, the defendant reduced the request to
writing on December 4, 1995. (R. 634). Among the questions posed by the defendant to his
trial counsel was the following:
Sarah Call testified that she and her father had watched a T.V.
show about sexual abuse. Wouldn't it be helpful to know the
name of the show and the content. This may lead to determining
her motivation. (R. 643).
Even though the approximate date of the television program was known by the
time of the preliminary hearing and even though seven months elapsed between the
preliminary hearing and the trial, defense counsel made no attempt to identify the television
program that prompted the initial disclosure by Sarah Call to her mother. Instead, trial
counsel filed an affidavit after the trial stating that the transcript of the television program was
new evidence that trial counsel did not know about at trial. (R. 678).
After the trial, the defendant himself, assisted by members of his family and
attorneys other than trial counsel, conducted an investigation and located a transcript of an
ABC News 20/20 program entitled "Making Him Pay," which aired January 28, 1994.
(R. 645).l In this program, reporters Barbara Walters and Hugh Downs discuss the case of
Desiray Bartak, a child approximately the same age as Sarah Call, who describes on camera
incidents of touching by a friend of her father in terms strikingly similar to those used by

^rial counsel attempts to take credit for the post-trial investigation in the motion for a new trial based
on newly discovered evidence when he says that the program was located by a "thorough investigation by
counsel." (R. 263). What trial counsel fails to mention is that he was not that counsel.
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Sarah Call to describe the actions of the defendant, who was also a friend of Sarah's father.
See "Making Him Pay" Transcript (R. 587-90) (attached in addendum).
The following is a summary of the similarities between Sarah Call's statements
about the alleged touching and the story aired on "20/20" about Desiray Bartak.
Similar Characteristics

Desiray Bartak

Sarah Call

Age

10 (R. 587)

10 (R. 764)

Alleged defendant

Father's best friend.
(R. 588)

Father's best friend.
(R. 764)

Reason for visiting defendant

Had children she liked to
play with. (R. 587)

Had children she liked to
play with. (R. 978)

Circumstances of alleged
molestation

Woke up to defendant
massaging and molesting
her (R. 587); on a second
occasion she had "covers
tightly tucked underneath"
her and "was tossing and
turning" so he couldn't get
in. (R. 588)

Woke up to defendant
rubbing and molesting her;
she "started moving
around." (R. 937)

Reaction of victim

Victim did not cry out or
urge him to stop, nor did he
try to explain what he was
doing. Victim pretended to
be sleeping because she was
too scared. Victim said to
herself "It's a dream.
Don't believe it, it's a
dream." (R. 587)

She did not cry out or urge
him to stop, nor did he try
to explain what he was
doing. She was scared.
She went back to sleep.
She believed that it was a
dream and told her mother
she thought it was a dream.
(R. 937-40, 1021)

Post-incident behavior

The next day neither the
defendant nor the victim
spoke of the incident.
(R. 587)

The next day neither the
defendant nor the victim
spoke of the incident.
(R. 942)

First reporting of the incident

Reluctant to tell father
because defendant was his
best friend; told mother.
(R. 588)

Reluctant to tell father, who
was defendant's close
friend; told mother. (R.
919)
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In addition, the television program transcript explains how Desiray Bartak
received national acclaim and accolades for reporting the abuse. (R. 587-89).
In the motion for a new trial, the defendant presented testimony to the trial
court that the television program about Desiray Bartak likely was the program that triggered
Sarah Call's disclosure and that evidence of the transcript of the television program would
have been important to both defense counsel and the jury. (R. 605, 1589). This testimony
was presented by Dr. Phillip W. Esplin, a psychologist with expertise in evaluating and
treating children who have been involved in inappropriate sexual conduct and in evaluating
"post event circumstances" that can lead to the alteration of recollections or the creation of
genuine but mistaken recollections. (R. 602-03). The expert testimony presented to the trial
court demonstrated the following:
a.

The close similarities between the television program and Sarah's

testimony raise questions about the potential effects of the content of the show on
Sarah's report. (R. 605, 1590).
b.

The importance of knowing what led a victim to come forward at a

particular time in order to generate hypotheses about motive of the witness. (R. 1589).
c.

The significance of a television program depicting a young girl who had

received national acclaim and accolades for reporting the abuse and the effects of such
information upon Sarah Call. (R. 1589-90).
d.

Sarah's recollection of the trampoline incident lacks sufficient memory

traces to have become an independent recollection. (R. 606).
e.

Sarah's testimony demonstrates an eagerness to please the questioner,

which increases the potential for witness unreliability. (R. 607).
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f.

Sarah's testimony that she was asleep when the incident occurred raises

questions of whether her memory capability was compromised by an altered state of
alertness. (R. 606).
g.

Generally, when children Sarah's age experience a novel, sexually

intrusive, discreet event, they reflect on that event on multiple occasions after its
occurrence which increases the strength and vividness of the recollections. This
process does not appear to have occurred with Sarah Call. (R. 606).
h.

Sarah's various statements suggest the possibility that the trampoline

episode may not have been reality based. (R. 607).
The trial court denied the motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of
counsel. (R. 1824). In doing so, the trial court specifically (and erroneously) found that the
jury had the information regarding the T.V. program.
It had the information about the T.V. program, and could
consider all those things, and did, I suppose.
(R. 1816).
Issue 3:

Was there prosecutorial misconduct by the state in its closing argument by
arguing matters not in evidence or contradicted by the evidence and by referring
to the fact that the defendant failed to call his son as a witness?
Sarah Call testified that she did not know how long Gollaher touched her on the

trampoline in July 1993. (R. 937). Sarah also testified that Gollaher only touched her
"private" one time, "up and down" during the July 1993 trampoline incident. (R. 962). Sarah
testified that the touching in the December 31, 1993 hot tub incident, was for a longer period
of time, lasting from six to nine seconds. (R. 969-70, 997-98).
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In closing argument, the state falsely represented to the jury that the length of
the touching in the December 31, 1993 hot tub incident was actually the length of the touching
during the July 1993 trampoline incident, in the following remarks:
"The touching that was described as prolonged." (R. 1316 (emphasis added)).
"It was six to nine seconds, if you put the evidence together. The
touching was skin to skin." (R. 1316).
"It was rubbing for a considerable period of time." (R. 1317) (emphasis
added).
"She says she is awakened by his hand in her vaginal area, rubbing six to nine
seconds." (R. 1323).
In addition, the state incorrectly tells the jury that Gollaher remembered that he
was rubbing Sarah Call. (R. 1317 ("Except that he remembered it was rubbing. It was
rubbing for a considerable period of time.") (emphasis added)).
The state also told the jury that Sarah Call's testimony at trial was consistent
with her testimony on a videotape that was made. (R. 1325). The videotape was not in
evidence. (R. 1325). The defendant's trial counsel objected to this reference. (R. 1325).
The trial court denied a motion for a mistrial based on the reference to the videotape, finding
that "there was nothing said about what was in the tape or anything like that." (R. 1373).
The state also referred to the fact that the defendant failed to call his son as a
witness. (R. 1361). The defendant's trial counsel objected to this remark. (R. 1361).
Issue 4:

Was the defendant deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel by reason of his attorney's failure to object to the improper remarks
of the prosecutor during closing argument and to the introduction of evidence of
the subsequent hot tub incident?
The facts relevant to this issue are fully set forth above under Issue 1 and

Issue 3.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court committed plain error by allowing extensive evidence

regarding a subsequent bad act of the defendant. This act consisted of an incident on
December 31, 1993, when the defendant allegedly touched the victim Sarah Call in the vaginal
area with his foot for six seconds while they were in a hot tub. This incident was the subject
of a charge that was dismissed after the preliminary hearing because Sarah Call testified that
the touching could have been accidental.
The trial court failed to make any finding that (1) there was a necessity for the
bad act evidence; (2) it was highly probative of a material issue of the crime charged; and (3)
its special probativeness and the necessity for it outweighed its prejudicial effect. See, e.g..
State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484, 490-91 (Utah 1997).
The trial court apparently admitted the bad act evidence for the purpose of
establishing the time frame in which Sarah Call first disclosed the trampoline incident for
which the defendant has been convicted. (R. 164). However, the fact that Sarah Call first
disclosed the allegations on or about February 1, 1994 was undisputed. Therefore, evidence
to establish the time frame when the allegations were made "was wholly unnecessary because
that fact was admitted." I(L at 491. Additionally, by Sarah Call's own testimony, it was the
viewing of a television program in late January 1994 that prompted the disclosure of the
trampoline incident. Thus, it was the date of the television program that was relevant to the
time frame of the disclosure, not the date of the hot tub incident. In any event, the state went
far beyond what was necessary to establish time frame, eliciting testimony in graphic detail
and referring to the subsequent bad act over twenty times in direct testimony and making it a
focal point in closing argument.
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The subsequent bad act in the hot tub on December 31, 1993, was not probative
of any material issue of the crime charged. Any minor probative value was greatly
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The prejudicial effect is compounded by the fact that the
trampoline incident in July 1993 also involved a visit to the hot tub prior to the touching on
the trampoline. Indeed, the state itself misstated the evidence in its closing argument, falsely
representing that the length of the touching in the subsequent hot tub event was actually the
length of the touching on the trampoline.
The state's case was extremely weak. This was a one witness case. There was
a total absence of any physical proof the offense occurred. Sarah Call's testimony was
inherently suspect because she testified that the incident occurred while she was awakening
from a state of sleep and because she thought the incident was actually a dream. In light of
the weakness of the state's case, it is highly likely that the introduction of the evidence
regarding the subsequent hot tub incident led to a different outcome than would have resulted
had the trial court properly excluded the evidence.
2.

The defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective

assistance of counsel by reason of his trial counsel's failure to investigate and obtain a copy of
the television program that prompted Sarah Call to report that she had been abused. The
approximate date of this television program was certainly known by trial counsel by June 23,
1995, the date of the preliminary hearing. The defendant specifically requested that trial
counsel investigate and obtain a copy of the transcript of that television program. Despite the
fact that the approximate time frame of the television program was known, and despite specific
requests from the defendant, trial counsel failed to investigate and obtain a transcript of the
television program.
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A transcript of the television program was obtained by the defendant after trial.
The transcript shows a disturbing similarity between Sarah Call's testimony and the story of
Desiray Bartak, the young girl featured in the television program. The transcript also reveals
that the young girl on the television program had received national attention and accolades for
coming forward with her alleged story of abuse. The defendant presented evidence to the trial
court that the similarities between the television program and Sarah's testimony raise questions
about the potential effects of the content of the show on Sarah's report. The defendant also
presented evidence to the trial court that knowledge of the transcript of the program, which
revealed the praise and attention received by the young girl, provided a possible motive for
Sarah Call's story.
Contrary to the trial court's finding, the jury did not have evidence of the
television program transcript before it. Rather, it only knew that Sarah had watched some
television program. The introduction of the television program transcript would have impacted
the credibility of Sarah's testimony.
The failure of trial counsel to properly investigate a case constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel. State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990). Given the weakness of
the state's case, including the suspect recollection of Sarah Call, additional evidence casting
any degree of doubt on Sarah Call's testimony would have likely led to a different outcome at
trial.
3.

The prosecutor incorrectly told the jury in closing argument that the

defendant remembered "rubbing" Sarah Call when in fact, the defendant denied ever touching
her. In addition, the prosecutor incorrectly told the jury that the length of the touching on the
trampoline was "prolonged," "considerable," and lasted "six to nine seconds," when in fact
Sarah Call testified that she did not know how long she was touched and testified that she was
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touched one time, Mup and down." It was the subsequent hot tub incident six months later that
lasted six to nine seconds.
The prosecutor also improperly told the jury that Sarah Call's testimony at trial
was consistent with her testimony on a videotape that was not introduced as evidence. Finally,
the prosecutor improperly remarked to the jury that the defendant had failed to call his son as
a witness, inferring that the son's testimony would have been unfavorable.
4.

The defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective

assistance of counsel by reason of his trial counsel's failure to object to the improper remarks
of the prosecutor during closing argument and failing to object to the introduction of evidence
of the hot tub incident.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING EXTENSIVE EVIDENCE
OF A SUBSEQUENT BAD ACT THAT WAS THE SUBJECT
OF A COUNT THAT HAD BEEN DISMISSED AT THE
PRELIMINARY HEARING.
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides as follows:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
Utah R. Evid. 404(b).2

2

The appellant has found no Utah cases addressing the admissibility of "subsequent" acts as opposed
to "prior" acts. By its terms, Rule 404(b) does not distinguish between "prior" and "subsequent" acts.
Moreover, other courts have determined that the principles governing other crimes are the same whether
the conduct occurred before or after the offense charged. See, e.g.. United States v. Latnev, 108 F.3d
1446, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Olivo. 80 F.3d 1466, 1469 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 117
S.Ct. 265 (1996). Consequently, the cases cited by appellant dealing with admissibility of "prior" acts are
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The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the introduction of evidence of other
acts presents "dangers to the fairness and integrity of a trial . . ." These dangers include
"[t]he over-strong tendency to believe the accused guilty of the charge merely because he is a
likely person to do such acts," and "the tendency to condemn not because the accused is
believed guilty of the present charge but because he has escaped unpunished from other
offenses." State v. Doporto. 935 P.2d 484, 490-91 (Utah 1997). The purpose of Rule 404(b)
is to avoid these dangers by proscribing the use of evidence of other acts except in narrow
circumstances. Id. at 491.
In Doporto, the Utah Supreme Court summarized the requirements that must be
met before evidence of other acts may be admitted pursuant to Rule 404(b).
To assure the integrity of the trial process, we hold that evidence
of prior crimes is presumed to be inadmissible and that, prior to
admitting it, the trial court must find (1) there is a necessity for
the prior crime evidence, (2) it is highly probative of a material
issue of the crime charged and (3) its special probativeness and
the necessity for it outweigh its prejudicial effect.
Id, at 490 (emphasis added) (relying on State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1987)
and State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221, 1229-30 (Utah 1989)).
In State v. Dibello. the court made clear that the burden is on the "proponent of
the evidence" to show that the potential for unfair prejudice did not outweigh its probativeness.
State v. Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1989).
Because of this, we have held that when evidence of this type is
offered, the presumption shifts; the evidence's potential for unfair
prejudice is presumed to outweigh its probativeness, and the
burden is on the proponent to show that this is not so.
Id.

fully applicable to the issue of admissibility of the "subsequent" act at issue in this case.
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The state also "bears the burden of demonstrating that the improperly elicited
testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Morrison. 1997 WL 228510 at
*3 (Utah Ct. App., May 8, 1997).
The Supreme Court further held that it will "review the trial court's rulings on
these issues more closely than ordinary rulings on relevance and with limited deference." Id.
"Consequently, we will examine a trial court's decision under Rule 404(b) with very limited
deference, according it a relatively small degree of discretion." Id. at 489.
The court will reverse based on an evidentiary error, even in the absence of an
objection by defense counsel, if the admission of the evidence was "plain error." Under the
plain error standard, the court will reverse if an error existed and the error was both obvious
and harmful. State v. Olsen. 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
As set forth below, the requirements for admissibility of evidence of other acts
were not met in the court below. Further, the admission of the subsequent bad act evidence
was plain error and harmful to the defendant.
A.

The Lower Court Failed to Make the Necessary Findings with Regard to the
Subsequent Bad Act Evidence.
Prior to admitting evidence of other acts, a trial court "must find" that (1) there

is a necessity for the evidence, (2) the evidence is "highly probative" of a "material issue" of
the crime charged, and (3) its special probativeness and the necessity for it outweighs its
prejudicial effect. Doporto. 935 P.2d at 490; Johnson. 748 P.2d at 1075; Dibello. 780 P.2d at
1229. In this case, the court made no findings whatsoever as to the subsequent bad act
relating to the New Year's Day hot tub incident. The court only refers to the bad act evidence
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injury instruction No. 18, in which it instructs the jury that the incident "was offered only to
set the time frame for when the allegations were made in this case." (R. 164).3
The trial court made nofindingsconcerning the "necessity" of the evidence of
the subsequent act. The trial court made nofindingsregarding whether evidence of an act
occurring six months after the incident for which the defendant was convicted was "highly
probative" of a "material issue" of the crime charged. The state did not meet its burden of
presenting evidence that the "potential for unfair prejudice does not 'outweigh its
probativeness,'" Dibello, 780 P.2d at 1229, and the trial court made no findings in this
regard. The trial court committed plain error by failing to make any of the necessary findings
prior to allowing the evidence of the subsequent bad act to be presented to the jury and the
defendant's conviction should be reversed.
B.

Evidence of the Subsequent Hot Tub Incident Was Not Relevant. Was Not Necessary to
Establish Time Frame, and Was Not Probative of any Material Issue of the Crime
Charged.
Rule 404(b) flatly prohibits evidence of other acts to prove the character of a

person in order to show action in conformity therewith. Doporto. 935 P.2d at 491. However,
evidence of other acts may be used "for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Rule
404(b).
In Doporto, the Supreme Court explained that even if evidence of other acts is
relevant to prove such issues, the other act must meet certain standards.

3

During the presentation of the bad act evidence by the prosecution, Gollaher's attorney asked for and
was granted a bench conference. (R. 910). However, there is no record of what transpired at the bench
conference and the record discloses only that the prosecution continued the same line of questioning after
the bench conference. (R. 910). As the Court of Appeals made clear in State v. Olsen. 869 P.2d 1004,
1009 n.7, dealing with a similar situation, the failure to make a record of the bench conference prevents
the appellate court from considering the conference on appeal.
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First, it must be necessary; it cannot be used to prove a point not
really contested. Second, it must be strongly probative of a
material issue, a probativeness that cannot serve as a ruse for
showing that the defendant's propensity is such that he is likely to
have committed the kind of crime charged.
Doporto, 935 P.2d at 491 (emphasis added).
1.

There was no dispute as to the time frame when the allegations were made.
The crime for which Gollaher was charged was the touching of the genitals of

Sarah Call while sleeping on a trampoline on or about July 1993. (R. 149). It was undisputed
that Sarah Call first disclosed the allegations regarding the trampoline just prior to February 1,
1994. The fact that there was no dispute concerning the date when Sarah first made the
allegations against Gollaher is clear from the opening statements, with both counsel
representing that the allegations came to light on or about February 1, 1994.
Mr. Cope:

"Mitch Clark . . . will tell you on the first day of February,
1994, he received a report that implicated Mr. Gollaher in sexual
abuse of Sarah." (R. 838).

Mr. Yengich:

"On February 1, or thereabouts, she is watching a show on
television. . . . and she tells mom." (R. 855-56).

In this case, as in Doporto, evidence of the time frame when Sarah first
reported the trampoline incident "was wholly unnecessary because that fact was admitted."
Doporto, 935 P.2d at 491.
2.

It was the date of the television program viewed by Sarah Call, not the date
of the hot tub incident, that was necessary to establish the time frame in
which Sarah Call made the allegations at issue in the case.
The court instructed the jury that the evidence of the subsequent hot tub incident

was "offered only to set the time frame for when the allegations were made in this case."
(R. 164). However, the subsequent hot tub incident was not the event that triggered the
disclosure by Sarah. Rather, the record is clear that the disclosure of both the trampoline
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incident and the New Year's Eve hot tub incident were triggered by Sarah's viewing of a
television program about a girl who claimed to have been abused. (R. 918).
Thus, it is the date of the television program that is relevant to the disclosure of
the allegations, not the date of the hot tub incident. In fact, Sarah testified that she did not
know how much time elapsed between the hot tub incident and her disclosure of the allegations
to her mother. (R. 917-918). She did testify, however, that she made the disclosure the same
night as the T.V. program. (R. 919). Thus, the hot tub incident was not relevant to
establishing the time when the allegations were made. Moreover, the time of reporting is not
even relevant to the charge in this case.
3.

The state went far beyond what was necessary to establish time frame when
the allegations were made.
The state did not limit the evidence to the facts necessary to establish the time

frame in which Sarah first disclosed the trampoline incident, greatly compounding the
prejudicial effect of the testimony. Rather, the state presented evidence of where Gollaher
allegedly touched Sarah (on her "private") and for how long she thought Gollaher touched her
("six seconds"). (R. 913-14, 969-70). As set forth in the statement of facts, the state referred
to this incident again and again, drilling into the jury the evidence of the subsequent bad act.
(R. 913-16, 920-23, 969-70). The state referred to the subsequent bad act over 20 times in
direct testimony and brought it up again three times in closing argument.
An example of the improper and prejudicial repetition of the subsequent act
evidence is illustrated at the close of the state's direct examination of Sarah. The hot tub
incident was introduced on Sarah's first day of testimony. On the second day of testimony,
near the end of the state's direct examination of Sarah, the state inexplicably jumped from
testimony regarding the July 1993 incident to the New Year's Eve hot tub incident, eliciting
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testimony that the touching in the hot tub lasted six seconds. The prosecutor then immediately
repeated the evidence, stating as follows:
Q.

(By Mr. Cope) One more question. When you said it
was about six seconds for the foot, right?

A.

Yes.

(R. 970).
Even if evidence of the hot tub incident was necessary to establish when Sarah
made the allegations, which it was not, there was no possible reason to intioduce into evidence
the details of the incident, including the amount of time Gollaher's foot allegedly touched
Sarah's vaginal area, other than to prejudice the defendant by attempting to show the jury that
"the defendant's propensity is such that he is likely to have committed the kind of crime
charged." Doporto. 935 F.2d at 491.
Indeed, that this was the intent of the state seems clear in closing argument
when the prosecutor argues that it was "the incident in the hot tub, again," that "galvanized"
Sarah Call into believing that she had been abused. (R. 1323). Clearly, the use of the work
"again" serves no purpose other than to imply that the defendant had a propensity to commit
the type of crime charged. This is not proper under Rule 404(b).
4.

The hot tub incident was not probative of any material issue of the crime
charged.
Even if relevant and necessary, evidence of other acts must be "highly probative

of material issue of the crime charged." IdL at 490. The only material issue of the crime
charged was whether Scott Gollaher improperly touched Sarah Call sometime in July 1993.
The hot tub incident, which occurred approximately six months after the trampoline incident,
was not relevant in any way to the whether the July 1993 incident occurred. The date the
allegations were first reported is not relevant to the crime charged.
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C.

Any Probativeness of Evidence of the Subsequent Hot Tub Incident Was Greatly
Outweighed by its Prejudicial Effect.
Even if the subsequent act evidence had some relevance, "it is still subject to

the protections of Utah R. Evid. 403." State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
See also Doporto, 935 P.2d at 493 (stating that "even if the prior crime evidence had some
minor probative value, the trial court's ruling under Utah Rule of Evidence 403 that the
prejudicial effect of the evidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value was also
incorrect.") The trial court was required to make findings as to whether that probative value
outweighed the prejudicial effect. Doporto, 935 P.2d at 490. The court made no such
findings.
The severe prejudicial effect that evidence of other "crimes, wrongs, or acts"
can have was clearly explained in Doporto. The prejudicial effect includes, "[t]he over-strong
tendency to believe the accused guilty of the charge merely because he is a likely person to do
such acts." Id.. In this case, after having the subsequent hot tub incident repeatedly drilled
into them, the jury is more likely to believe the defendant committed the touching in July 1993
because he has a history of similar acts.
The prejudicial effect of allowing evidence of the New Year's Eve hot tub
incident is compounded in this case because the July 1993 trampoline incident also involved
testimony regarding Sarah getting into the hot tub. (R. 929-34). The defendant did not get
into the hot tub with Sarah at the July 1993 trampoline incident. (R. 932-33). However, the
defendant was in the hot tub with Sarah at the New Year's Eve hot tub incident and allegedly
touched her vaginal area with his foot for six seconds at that time. (R. 913-16, 920-23, 96970). Introduction of the subsequent hot tub incident was extremely likely to lead the jury into
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confusing the testimony relating to the hot tub incident with facts relating to the trampoline
incident.
Indeed, the state itself misstated the evidence in its closing argument, falsely
attributing facts relating to the hot tub incident to the trampoline incident. The prosecutor
represented to the jury that
The touching that was described as prolonged. It was six to nine
seconds, if you put the evidence together. The touching was skin
to skin.
(R. 1316).
On a second occasion, the prosecutor told the jury that
[s]he says she is awakened by his hand in her vaginal area,
rubbing six to nine seconds.
(R. 1323).
In fact, Sarah testified that it was the New Year's Eve hot tub incident, not the
trampoline incident, that lasted six seconds. (R. 970). Sarah testified that she did not
remember how long Gollaher touched her on the trampoline. (R. 939). She further testified
that the rubbing occurred one time, "up and down." (R. 962).
The risk of prejudicial effect from confusing the two incidents became a reality
in the closing argument of the state. The jury was now presented with two events that could
be and were easily confused, coupled with the false representation by the state that the
touching on the trampoline lasted as long as nine seconds, when in reality, the testimony was
that the alleged touching was more brief, once up and once down. (R. 962). The subsequent

32

act in the hot tub had no probative value and presented a high potential for unfair prejudicial
effect on the defendant.4
D.

Admission of Evidence of the Subsequent Hot Tub Incident was Harmful Error.
For error to be harmful, there must be a "reasonable possibility that the

evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." Morrison, 1997 WL
228510 at *3; State v. Featherson. 781 P.2d 424, 431 (Utah 1989) (there must be a
"reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant in its absence."). In
evaluating harm, the court looks at "a host of factors, including . . . the overall strength of the
state's case." State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1011 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Other factors that
may be considered in determining harm is whether the reference was isolated and whether the
trial court gave a limiting instruction. State v. Reyes. 861 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).
First and foremost, the state's case was extremely weak. This was a one
witness case. There was a total absence of any physical proof that the offense occurred. The
state's only witness, Sarah Call, was 10 years old when the incident took place and only 13
years old when she testified. The incident lasted only a few seconds. Sarah's testimony was
inherently suspect because her initial memory of the incident was, by her own voluntary
statements, that it was nothing more than a dream.5 When Sarah first reported the incident to
her mother over six months later, she voiced self doubt, saying that she did not know whether

4

Although, as noted above, Rule 404(b) does not distinguish between "prior" and "subsequent" acts,
it has been noted that in some circumstances subsequent extrinsic offense evidence may be substantially
less relevant than would a prior extrinsic offense. See, e.g.. United States v. Jimenez. 613 F.2d 1373,
1376 (5th Cir. 1980) (subsequent extrinsic offense "bears substantially less on predisposition that would
a prior extrinsic offense."). Thus, the trial court's error here had the potential for even greater harm than
if prior bad act evidence were involved.
5

We now know that her report also conformed to the content of a television program she had just seen.
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it really happened or whether it was a dream. According to Sarah's testimony, the brief
incident on the trampoline occurred during an altered state of mental alertness while she was
awakening from a state of sleep. Gollaher denied touching Sarah on the trampoline. The
evidence at trial from four different witnesses established that Sarah visited the Gollaher
residence numerous times after the incident, contradicting her statement that she tried to stay
away from the Gollaher residence.
The prejudicial effect of the subsequent hot tub incident is exacerbated by the
fact that the reference to the subsequent act was not isolated. Reyes, 861 P.2d at 1057. As
explained above, the state referred to the hot tub incident over twenty times and over a period
of two days, concluding its examination of Sarah Call with testimony regarding the hot tub
incident, and made the hot tub incident a focal point of closing argument, confusing the two
events and stating that it was the hot tub incident, "again," that "galvanized" Sarah into
believing that the trampoline incident actually happened, implying that the defendant had a
propensity to commit the acts charged. (R. 1323 (emphasis added)).
In light of the weakness of the state's case, it is highly likely that the
introduction of the evidence regarding the subsequent bad act led to a different outcome than
would have resulted if the trial court had properly excluded the evidence. Given the weakness
of the state's case, the repeated reference to the subsequent act evidence, and the state's
confusing, misleading, and inaccurate statements with regard to the subsequent bad act, and
the accompanying prejudicial effect, the limiting instruction by the court was not sufficient to
undo the damage that had been done. It is well accepted that limiting instructions cannot
"undo serious prejudice." State v. Peters. 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). See also
Bruton v. United States. 391 U.S. 123, 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 1628 (1968) (holding that clear
instructions to the jury to disregard inadmissible hearsay evidence inculpating the defendant
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was not sufficient to cure the error); Krulewitch v. United States. 336 U.S. 440, 453, 69
S.Ct. 716, 723 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[t]he naive assumption that prejudicial
effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury, all practicing lawyers know to be
unmitigated fiction."). At most, a limiting instruction may "reduce somewhat" the prejudice
suffered by the defendant. Peters. 796 P.2d at 712.
In this case, the limiting instruction's effectiveness in reducing prejudice was
diminished by the fact that the instruction was not given "at the earliest opportunity," Reyes,
861 P.2d at 1057, but was delayed until the conclusion of the case. (R. 164).
In light of all the foregoing factors, there is a "reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result for the defendant" in the absence of the improper admission of the subsequent
bad act evidence. Featherson. 781 P.2d at 431.
E.

The Admission of Evidence of the Subsequent Hot Tub Incident was Obvious Error.
To find plain error, it must appear from an examination of the record "that it

should have been obvious to a trial court that it was committing error." State v. Eldredge.
773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert, denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989). See also State v. Verde. 770
P.2d 116, 122 n.ll (Utah 1989) (the "obviousness" prong of the plain error rule amounts to
the appellate court reaching the conclusion that, given the circumstances, "the trial court
should have been aware that an error was being committed at the time."). As the Utah
Supreme Court made clear in Doporto. "the principle that evidence is not admissible to show a
defendant's bad character or propensity to commit criminal acts is a fundamental tenant of
American jurisprudence and has been recognized in this Court's opinions for over ninety
years." It has been recognized that generally, inquiry into the details of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts constitutes "plain error." See, e.g.. State v. Tucker. 800 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah Ct.
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App. 1990) ("Generally, inquiry into the details of prior convictions has been found to be so
prejudicial as to amount to plain error.").
In this case, the obviousness of the error is underlined by the fact that the trial
court had already dismissed the charge concerning the hot tub incident after the preliminary
hearing. (R. 72, R. 1832). Having dismissed the charge, the trial court was well aware of
the fact that this incident was another "wrong or act" as defined in Rule 404(b), that there was
insufficient evidence to support the charge, and that Rule 404(b) precluded admission of the
subsequent bad act evidence.
POINT II
THE DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY REASON OF HIS ATTORNEY'S FAILURE
TO INVESTIGATE AND PRESENT EVIDENCE OF A TRANSCRIPT OF A TELEVISION
PROGRAM THAT SARAH CALL WATCHED THAT PROMPTED HER DISCLOSURE OF
THE ALLEGED ABUSE.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused "the right . . . to have Assistance
of counsel for his defense." U.S. Const, amend. VI. "The right to counsel has been held to
be 'the right to effective assistance of counsel.'" State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah
1990) (quoting McMann v. Richardson. 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)). In determining
whether criminal defendants have been denied the constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel, the Utah Supreme Court has followed the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Strickland v. Washington. 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court
established a two part test:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel"
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so
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serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.
I d at 2064.
• To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must "'identify the
acts or omissions' which, under the circumstances, 'show that counsel's representation fell
hd,3W an objective standard of reasonableness,'" Templin. 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting
Strickland, 104 N I "I il -"lllili, ,'OM)
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presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound
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determining whether counsel's performance was ineffective, the court cannot rely on counsel's
experience or on whether counsel met the "prevailing norms," but must instead "lc :>k to
counsel's actual performance to determine whether it was adequate." Taylor v. Warden, 905
P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995).
To meet the second prong of the test, a defendant "'must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
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undermine confidence in the outcome.'" Templin, 805 P.2d at 187 (quoting Strickland, 104
S

).
The defendant has established both prongs of the Strickland test, and the

conviction should be reversed based on ineffective assistance of counsel,
A.

Trial Counsel Failed to Properly Investigate and Obtain a Copy of the Television
Program Transcript.
T

investigation does not meet the objective standard of reasonableness required to provide
effective assistance of counsel. In ' I emplin. a defendant moved for a new trial based on

1

ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming that trial counsel failed to contact several potential
witnesses named by the defendant. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that even if
the witnesses had been called, the outcome of the trial would likely have remained the same.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. In so doing, the Court made clear that
failure to investigate satisfies the first part of the Strickland test.
If counsel does not adequately investigate the underlying facts of
a case, including the availability of prospective defense witnesses,
counsel's performance cannot fall within the "wide range of
reasonable professional assistance." This is because a decision
not to investigate cannot be considered a tactical decision. It is
only after an adequate inquiry has been made that counsel can
make a reasonable decision to call or not to call particular
witnesses for tactical reasons. Therefore, because defendant's
trial counsel did not make a reasonable investigation into the
possibility of procuring prospective defense witnesses, the first
part of the Strickland test has been met.
Templin, 805 P.2d at 188. See also Taylor, 905 P.2d at 283 (holding that there was no
ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel interviewed individuals the defendant identified
as potential witnesses).
In State v. Huggins. 920 P.2d 1195 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the court explained
that "'[SJtrategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely
to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.
In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.'" LI at 1198 (quoting State v.
Crestani. 771 P.2d 1085, 1090 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)).
In this case, the defendant specifically requested that his trial counsel investigate
the date of the television program watched by Sarah Call and obtain a transcript. (R. 633).
Trial counsel failed to do so. After the trial, the defendant himself conducted an investigation
and obtained a copy of the transcript. (R. 645). His trial counsel then filed a motion for a
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new trial based on newly discovered evidence, arguing that the television transcript could not
have been obtained prior to trial. (R. 266, 678). However, "'new evidence' is not evidence
which was available to defendant but not obtained by him prior to the time of trial. Nor is it
evidence that he knew about or could have discovered prior to trial." State j ^ Williams, i 12
P.2d 220, 223 (Utah 1985) (citations omitted).
1

defendant nor trial counsel "was aware of the program v" (R. 678). However, it is clear
from the recora

:

.Revision

program. Furthermore, it was clear that the television program must have aired several days
prior to February 3, 1994 During the March 9, 1994 police interview Sarah revealed that
the television program had prompted her disclosure of the allegations and that she had watched
the program four to five weeks before the interview, placing the program at the end of January

confirmed by Sarah during the June 23, 1995 preliminary hearing, i ? "xi* v
al ! Il ni i ni limit lliiiil Siiiiih
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program, and that the Division of Family Services had contacted the Salt Lake County Sheriff
of the allegations by February
Trial counsel knew about the television program. The defendant specifically
asked defense counsel to obtain a transcript of the program. Trial counsel simply failed to
investigate and obtain a copy of the transcript. The defendant's trial counsel's failure to
adequately investigate the facts of this case and obtain a copy of the television program
transcript constitutes ineffective assistance

Templin -

n
i

B.

There is a Reasonable Probability That. But For Trial Counsel's Failure to Investigate,
the Result of the Trial Would Have Been Different.
In determining whether trial counsel's unprofessional errors affected the

outcome of the trial, the court "should consider the totality of the evidence, taking into
account such factors as whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an
isolated effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Templm, 805 P.2d at
187 (citing Strickland. 104 S.Ct. at 2069).
The weakness of the state's case has been set forth in detail above. In Templin.
as in this case, the conviction was "not strongly supported by the record," in that there was
only one witness who gave direct evidence of the defendant's guilt, and there was no
independent physical evidence. I(L The testimony of the witness in this case, Sarah Call,
was inherently suspect because she testified that the incident occurred while she was coming
out of a state of sleep, and that she had long thought that the incident was only a dream.
(R. 937, 969). Thus, additional evidence casting doubt on Sarah Call's testimony would have
likely led to a different outcome at trial.
1.

The similarity between the television program and Sarah Call's testimony,
coupled with Sarah's testimony that she thought the incident was a dream,
cast doubt on the accuracy of Sarah's testimony.
There is no doubt that Sarah's testimony parallels the story of Desiray Bartak in

the television program that Sarah watched. See comparison between Bartak story and Sarah
Call testimony, supra at 17. It is undisputed that Sarah had thought that the trampoline
incident was a dream. (R. 969). It is also undisputed that viewing the television program
prompted Sarah to disclose the trampoline incident to her mother. (R. 918) But even then,
Sarah still informed her mother that she did not know whether it happened or whether she was
dreaming. (R. 1021). Given Sarah's vague and uncertain recollection, the similarity between
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the television program and Sarah's testimony, and the fact that it was the television program
that triggered Sarah's disclosure, a jury could have reasonably concluded that the television
program altered and affected Sarah's testimony.
The defendant presented eviden

the trial <

characteristics between the television program and Sarah's testimony raises questions about the

trial court itself noted the negative impact that exact testimony from two instances can have,
remarking tn

> testimoi

rial had been exactly the same as her testimony at

the preliminary hearing, . ^ icaii^ u worried about it . . . .

(R. 1821-22). Evidence of the

transcript of the television program would have provided the jury with that same worry,
causing the jury to wonder why Sarah's testimony was so su
heard on television.
inMlective assistance
of counsel, finding that the u*w 'had the information about the r
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program, and could
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and must be set aside. Templin, 805 P.2d at 186. The record is clear that the only
information the jury had was that Sarah had watched a television program that prompted her
disclosure. (R. 918). The jury did not have the evidence of the transcript of the television
program, which reveals the disturbing similarities between Sarah Call's testimony and the
story of Desiray Bartak. Given the weakness of the state's case, this nlilitMni.il n mlnn e
would have cast additional doubt on Sarah's testimony, affecting the entire evidentiary picture
,111 Ill II II Ilk I' 1V1 I' i l l l i n i ' I

J! ( l i f f f T C f i i l l l l l l 111111".

41

2.

Evidence of the contents of the television program would have provided
evidence of a motive for Sarah Call's testimony.
In his motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the

defendant also presented evidence to the trial court that it is important to know what led a
victim to come forward at a particular time in order to generate hypotheses about motive of
the witness. (R. 1589). The television program at issue in this appeal depicted a young girl
who had received national acclaim and accolades for reporting the abuse. (R. 587-90, 1589).
Contrary to the finding of the trial court, the jury did not have this information before it.
(R. 1816). The acclaim and accolades received by Desiray Bartak could have provided a
motive for Sarah Call making her own, nearly identical allegations. Again, given the
weakness of the state's case, such motive evidence would have cast additional doubt on
Sarah's testimony, likely leading to a different outcome.
POINT III
THE STATE COMMITTED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN ITS CLOSING
ARGUMENT BY ARGUING MATTERS NOT IN EVIDENCE OR CONTRADICTED BY
THE EVIDENCE AND BY REFERRING TO THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT
FAILED TO CALL HIS SON AS A WITNESS.
An appellate court will reverse a jury verdict on the basis of prosecutorial
misconduct if the defendant demonstrates that
tf

[t]he actions or remarks of [the prosecutor] call to the attention
of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in
determining its verdict, and, if so, under the circumstances of the
particular case, whether the error is substantial and prejudicial
such that there is a reasonable likelihood that, in its absence,
there would have been a more favorable result."
State v. Tennev, 913 P.2d 750, 754-55 (Utah Ct. App.) (quoting State v. Wright, 893 P.2d
1113, 1118 (UtahCt. App. 1995).
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This c :« in: II: has held that "[a] comment by a prosecutor during closing argument
that the jury consider matters outside the evidence is prosecutorial misconduct." State v.
Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 344 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In this case, there is no question that the
prosecutor made improper comments on matters that were not in evidence. Such comments
constitute prosecutorial misconduct. The only question is whether the comments were so
fiiqiiiilliN lull illllliiiiill I h n r ih i irnsonahh 1 lilrlilin nil llli ill iiiiii iilllii
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more favorable result to the defendant. This issue of harm is the same issue that has been

light of the weakness of the state's case and the fact that the improper comments went directly
to the heart of the case, i e., the touching of Sarah C.

- JoHaher. Each < s-.;

improper comments prejudiced the defendant.
4

Prosecutor's Improper Comments on Matters Outside of the Evidence.
1.

rhe prosecutor improperly told the jury that the defendant remembered
"rubbing" Sarah Call.
The prosecutor told the jury that the defendant remembered touching Sarah Call
"Except that he remembered it was rubbing, n was rubbing for a
considerable period of time." (R. 1317 (emphasis added)).
Ilitit vv'tti* iim tyiikiiit dial (iiilLilii i remembered it was rubbing

I o the

contrary, Gollaher testified that he did not touch Sarah. (R. 1260). As in State v. Palmer,
this misstatement "went to the heart of the state's case.

Palmer. 860 P.2d at 344 * rhere can

be no more prejudicial statement than for the prosecutor to tell the jury that the defendant
remembered doing an act that the defendant denied doing. This misstatement alone is
sufficient to justify a reversal of the conviction.
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2.

The prosecutor improperly and incorrectly told the jury that the touching
on the trampoline was prolonged and lasted six to nine seconds.
In closing argument, the prosecutor spent a great deal of time telling the jury

that the evidence had been that Gollaher touched Sarah Call on the trampoline for a
"prolonged," "considerable" period of time, "six to nine seconds."
"It was six to nine seconds, if you put the evidence together. The
touching was skin to skin." (R. 1316).
"She says she is awakened by his hand in her vaginal area, rubbing six to nine
seconds." (R. 1323).
"It was rubbing for a considerable period of time." (R. 1317) (emphasis
added).
"The touching that was described as prolonged." (R. 1316 (emphasis added)).
These statements are in direct conflict with the actual evidence. In fact, Sarah
Call testified that she did not know how long Gollaher touched her on the trampoline in July
1993. (R. 937). Sarah also testified that Gollaher only touched her "private" one time, "up
and down" during the July 1993 trampoline incident. (R. 962). It was the subsequent bad act
in the hot tub on December 31, 1993, not the July 1993 trampoline incident, that allegedly
lasted from six to nine seconds. (R. 969-70, 997-98).
The prosecutor clearly tried to convince the jury that the length of the touching
during the December 31, 1993 incident was in fact the length of the touching during the
July 3, 1993 incident. There is a substantial difference between a short touching "up and
down" that could not have lasted more than a second or two, and a "prolonged" touching for a
"considerable" amount of time, from "six to nine seconds." As the prosecutor himself argued
to the jury, the touching "could have been inadvertent" if it were a short touching. (R. 1317).
See also State v. Peters. 796 P.2d 708, 711 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding that "the duration
of the defendant's act" is a factor to consider in whether "indecent liberties" had been taken in
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touching, the prosecutor argued,

presented "pretty firm circumstantial evidence that the person who was doing it was awake."
(R ] 311 5 )

I I iifortunately, the prosecutor had misrepresented the evidence with regard to the

length of the touching on the trampoline. This misstatement was extremely prejudice
defendant, providing the jury with the impression that the touching could not have been
accidental.
The prosecutor improperly told the jury that Sarah Call's testimony at trial
was consistent with her testimony on a videotape that was not introduced
into evidence.
The evidence in this case included testimony from Mitchell Clan
M.

•;

March 9, 1994.
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,. i'heic was no evidence whatsoever of the contents of that

videotape.
In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that Sarah Call's testimon) at
trial had been consistent with the videotape.
And she tells somebody. And those people do the right thing.
And it takes a long time before we get here, and her memory
degrades, just like everybody else's does. But there is a record,
very early on. We made a video record of this. She is
consistent.
(R. 1325) (emphasis added).
videotape was 'not iix e vi<i eilce

(E 1 325)

The prosecutor clearly was

attempting to bolster the credibility of the state's only witness, who had a suspect recollection
of the incident, by telling the jury that Sarah's testimony at trial was consistent with a video
record made early on. These remarks about matters not in evidence were improper.
Defendant's trial counsel objected to these remarks, moving for a mistrial.
370-73).

I
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about what was in the tape or anything like that." (R. 1373). This finding is clearly
erroneous. The prosecutor told the jury what was in the videotape. The prosecutor stated that
the contents of the videotape were consistent with Sarah Call's trial testimony, thus telling the
jury that the videotape contained the same facts heard at trial. Again, this is improper and
constitutes prosecutorial misconduct. Palmer. 860 P.2d at 344.
As in Palmer, the prosecutor in this case made repeated remarks that were
simply not supported by or in fact were contradicted by the evidence. Palmer also involved a
man accused of sexual abuse of a minor. In that case, the prosecutor told the jury in closing
argument that the defendant in that case had touched a young boy's genitals while the boy was
sitting on the defendant's lap. There was no evidence of any abusive touching while the boy
was sitting on the defendant's lap. Id at 344. The prosecutor in Palmer also erroneously told
the jury that the defendant had told the boy's mother about "seven different counts," thus
evidencing "a consciousness of guilt." Id at 345. In fact, the evidence contradicted the
prosecutor's statements, as the defendant expressly denied ever mentioning the potential for
seven charges to the mother. Id. Finally, the prosecutor had stated that the court could take
judicial notice of the existence and location of a hot tub business where the defendant allegedly
touched the boy. In fact, there was no testimony regarding the business's address. The court
held that this improper argument "could well have convinced the jury that the hot tub evidence
was stronger than it actually was." Id, The appellate court reversed the conviction in Palmer,
determining that these remarks by the prosecutor were improper, went to the heart of the
issues in the case, constituted plain error, and were harmful to the defendant. Id.
Likewise, in this case, all of the improper remarks by the prosecutor went to the
heart of the case, i.e., whether the defendant intentionally touched Sarah Call. As in Palmer,
the improper comments of the prosecutor "could well have convinced the jury that the [state's
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set forth fully above, the prosecutor's improper remarks likely had an impact on the outcome
the motion for a mistrial based on the improper
larks that were objected to by trial counsel. The other improper remarks were clearly
contradictory to the evidence in the case, and constitute plain error that justifies reversal of the
conviction.
™

The Prosecutor Improperly Remarked to the Jury that the Defendant Had Failed to Call
His Son as a Witness.
In his closing argument, the prosecutor also referred to the fact that the

defendant failed to call his son Peter Gollaher as a witness. (R 1361)
counsel objected to this remark. (R.

IJUI;.

The defendant's trial

under Utah law it is imp ;><

comment on the failure of the other party to call a particular witness, unless it is shown that

adversary's power to produce." State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052. 1057 (Utah 1985).
Comment l

ihiivl i>. In •«I• .i ul wiloesses is improper if these conditions necessary for

comment are lacking. IdL at 1058.
The uncontroverted testimony at trial was that Peter Gollaher was asleep during
the alleged touching. (R. 929, 1007). Consequently, it was not possible that Peter GoUaher's
testimony could have "elucidated" the events on the trampoline and the prosecution could not
satisfy the conditions necessary for it to comment on the defendant's failure h
witness.

.ill IVlni ,r a

|
Under lln

missing wilitcss

IIIIIMMU I.1

" ml flu ilHondaiil hilled In i .ill i 11 nl mm

witness, it can be inferred "that the testimony, if produced, would have been unfavorable."
missing witness inference" was improper by the
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prosecutor and prejudiced the defendant by allowing the jury to infer that Peter Gollaher's
testimony at trial would have somehow been unfavorable to Gollaher. The prejudice of this
comment was exacerbated by the fact that the prosecutor made the improper remark during his
final closing remarks to which defendant had no opportunity to respond.
POINT IV
THE DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY REASON OF HIS ATTORNEY'S FAILURE
TO OBJECT TO THE IMPROPER REMARKS OF THE PROSECUTOR DURING
CLOSING ARGUMENT AND TO THE INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE OF THE
SUBSEQUENT HOT TUB INCIDENT.
The standard of review for ineffective assistance counsel under Strickland has
been fully discussed above, supra at 36-37, and is hereby adopted by reference. The failure to
object at trial "likely fails to meet the standard of reasonable representation, . . . thus
satisfying the first prong of Strickland." State v. Callahan. 866 P.2d 590, 595 (Utah Ct. App.
1993) (dealing with a failure to object to questioning concerning a prior conviction). In this
case, the defendant's trial counsel failed to object to the improper remarks of the prosecutor
concerning the length of time of the touching on the trampoline and the remark that the
defendant "remembered it was rubbing." (R. 1317) The defendant also failed to object to the
introduction of the subsequent bad act evidence relating to the December 31, 1993 hot tub
incident.6
As set forth in detail above, the weakness of the state's case, consisting of one
witness with inherently suspect testimony based on her admission that she thought the incident

6

As noted above, trial counsel did ask for and receive a bench conference at the time the State began
to introduce the bad act evidence. (R. 910). However, because the conference was not recorded, there
is no record of what occurred at that time. Even if trial counsel did object to the introduction of the bad
act evidence at the bench conference, trial counsel erred in failing to make a record of the objection, thus
precluding its consideration on appeal. State v. Olsen. 869 P.2d 1004, 1009 n.7.
48

was a dream, makes it reasonably probable that a different result would have occurred were it
not for trial counsel's failure to object to the introduction of the bad act evidence and the
improper remarks of the state during closing argument.
CONCLUSION
The trial court committed plain error by allowing extensive evidence regarding
i rtis bad. act
evidence was not necessary to establish the time frame in which the allegations were made, for
I

crime, wrong or act" was not probative of nnv -mtr^in1
issue of the criniL- charged and served no purpose other than to prejudice the defenda
presenting the implication that the defendant committed the crime charged because he is a
likely person to do such acts. The defendant's trial ecui

tT

*

:t

to the introduction of this evidence.
In

ivestigate

and obtain a copy of the transcript of the television program that prompted Sarah Call's
dhi'lnsiiir ill lln iibii1.

h'spiii I IIHIIA IIIIIJ'" illlie approximate date of the program and in the face

of specific requests from the defendant. The transcript, showing a disturbing similarity' to
Sarah I nil s testimony and describing the national acclaim and accolades received by the girl
making the allegations in the television program, would have impacted the credibility
i ",iill and provided a potential motive for the disclosure of the alleged abuse.
Finally, the improper remarks nl illli fiiiasrt n (mi Ih ing i l o s i n g <ngn m i
constitute prosecutorial misconduct. The defendant's trial counsel was ineffective in failing to

with the trampoline incident and stating that the defendant remembered rubbing Sarah Call.
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Given the weakness of the state's case, the errors of the court, the misconduct
of the prosecutor, and the ineffective assistance of counsel likely led to a different outcome at
trial than would have resulted but for the errors and misconduct. For these reasons, the
conviction of the defendant must be reversed.
DATED this

day of June, 1997.
PARRY LAWRENCE & WARD

BRENT D. WARD, Esq.
JAMES K. TRACY, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
Scott Logan Gollaher

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLANT SCOTT LOGAN GOLLAHER, was hand-delivered this 20th day of June,
1997, to the following:
Christine F. Soltis
Assistant Attorney General
124 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
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waa the ceae jttet thia creek with Michael Jeckeoa. Hi
cuter aattlad out of court, never having revealed hie n
Tonight youVe going to meat a young girl who waa ee*
January 28,1094
abuead and deeided to apeak eut ebout it in a i
HUGH DOWNS, ABC Newe: Oood evtnlng. I'm Hugh courageoua and unprecedented way.
HUGH DOWNS: You know, thia may be the flrae
Dflwni.
a child hea puraued her attaokar with such detent
BARBARA WALTERS, ABO Newe: And I'm Barbara that
tion.
revetting not only hie name, but her own. and hf
Weltara and thii It 20/20.
a wa&known lawyer to make the cat*.
Yet. the didn't
ANNOUNCER: From ABC Ntwi, around the world and there.
f
Aa
Tcm
Jarriel
reporte*
ahe
a
now
an intpiratk
Into your home, thi ttortet that touch your life, with Hugh
other
victim*
Uka
hereelf,
to
thouaanda
or young pc
Downs And Barbara Waltera — thii la 2A/20.
who have bean handling tha pain of eexual abute elani
Tonight, you'll meet an amaiing young girl
TOM JARRIEU ABO Newts /befee-oetr; In her b
DES1RAY BARTAK. Sexual Abate Survivor. And
panta, untucked ahirt end tncakere, 13*yea
thara ara to many hide that ait out there halng *buttd«
Deairay Bartak looka every ineh the "BOa teenager
and thay need help,
her
life ie In no way ordinaiy. Today ehe baa flown
ANNOUNCER: Sht wti violate 1 lij i In I n ! 1 illll.,, 1 ill
her home in California to Chicago to appear en i
overoamt her fear.
TV talk ehow, A turvivor of sexual abutt a;
PE8ERAY; I wai afraid that ht would hurt tomeone in
tray hat gone on to turn her palu into a p
my family 1ft told.
e after emergtng from a daep dcprmlon.
ANNOUNCER: Sht took him to court, put him bahl
tneeeage: when abuaadt children nuut tpaak up an
bare, then went public with htr ttory.
remain ailent.
BE8IRAY: I fait that ! had to do that for the oihtr chilDE8IRAY BARTAK* 6e*ual Abute Survivor:
dren.
need to tall oomeone, *caute If you don't it't going
ANNOUNCER.' Tom Jarrtel with a little girl you'll never
fntida
you fortvtr and you're going to have that
forgtti A champion1 for tha ailtnt victims of taxu&l abate —
9
that
t
intlda
that youVe not goingtobe ablt got rid
•Making Him Fay/
JARRIEL: [wUhovtr] i To kida all acroaa tht ecu
And a dramatic rac againtt time — Infanta Hit thaae
tht't a leader* a champion for childron'e rightt*
won't survive without a now haarL Tht teareh for donora it
ttory btgan three jpmwiti
ABir-whtn lQ«yec
under way. An enxiou* family welU.
Dtelray waa vWtintfher divorced father. <\h u*ud
DOMINICA PETERSEN! Mother: Ht't Jutt ona tlttla
tag thttt aummer wlts,>H*s'QUld epon jhclme wit!
guy and I love him.
.
godfather, Richard StreaU, who had children Detir
• ANNOUNCER Than Hugh Downt takta you on aflightof
hope and Into tht operating room for the critical ^<likedtopleywith«
DE6IRAY: We ware playing Nintendo end aatlni
transplant.
eendwichaa end tvtrything wet fine.
Dr. tCONARO BAILEY, Lama Unda Univeralty
c
JARRIEL:
(volct-owr] When did you know torn*
Madical Center: U e a miracle. It it en Absolute
waa
wrong?
mirada.
ANNOUNCER: A atory of joy and
tragedy: to lata the lift K DESIRAY: I had woken up to him mtttaginf tm
W
tnolaitlngme.
of ona child, anothtr must die— A Qifl From the Heart."
JARRIELs Did you cry out, or urge hlw in ill i i
Plua, you aaw Nancy Kerrigan right after the attack*
Uy to explain what he wet doing?
Now follow tha bicerre trail of tha mtn charged with tha > .C ha
DESIRAY: No, I pretended like I waa eleeplng/a
crime.
waa too wared. And I wee tolling myaetft mlV§ a d
Private Inveettgatoft One man taldv / < Hon*
m GARY CROWE,
f
believe it# it'a a dream. life not happenin
"Why don t wa jutt hill her?"
teemed
forever* end I never thought it waa going tt
ANNOUNCER: Polka aay they crieacroiitd tha country,
JARRtELe
faota-ovtr] Detlrty told ua tha next
etalking tha victim, trading information and money* How
neither
the
nor
her godfather epoke of the Incident
did tlie plan untold? How much did Tonya Harding know? * waa cfiiiAiaed and
ecarcd.
TONYA HARDING. Ice Skater; I had no prior
DESlRAYt
I
fait
that U your godfather can do t
knowladgt of th* plenned eaccult on Nancy Kerrigan.
you«
who
waa
auppoeed
to love you and take cere«
ANNOUNCER: Lynn 8harr traeee19the crime that ahocked
and you're tuppoaad to trutt htm, then anyone cai
tha country — T h e Kerrigan Plot. Thete atort at tonight,
toyoiL
January 26 1GM, afttr thin brltf tnea a age.
WAYANNB
KRUG£R« Mother; The moment th
lOommwrotot brt&kj
at back from her father^ houae, ahe want atral
er room*
Making Him Pay
JARRIELt (veic+evtr) Wayatmt Kruger it Dot
knem. The ence«wonderful rdailonahlp witl
BARBARA WALTERS: over *he yaart* v t have aeon and
deughter teemed to deteriorate overnight.
heard of many triaU of child abute. in almoat all of them,
tha children have not bttn idtntifltd publicly. In fact, that
Mrt, KRUOER- fiha ttarted ftghting with Ut, ytl
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me etot, yelling et her eltter a lot.
DEBTRAY; Even though me and my mom were an dote,
1 didn't think that ehe would btlltvt mi baeaua* he v u
aa claaa to tha family, and f wai afirald that ha would
hurt eomeene in my family If I told.
Mr*, KRUGER: Her grtdee want down immedietcly. X
mean, right away, the loat concentration.
DESIKAY; I want Into a huge depreeeien where I waa
wearing all black.
Mra. KRUGER Almost Ilka aha waa ooneealing her*
eelf.
HEB1HAY: 1 wouldn't aleap and if I did, I'd have fcor*
rlftenlghtmaret*
Mra. KRUOER: Sha alwaya kept her bedroom door
dated. 1 mean, there ware to many ilgni that the bad
boon lexuaUy abutad that it wet unbelievable.
JARHFEL: (vmai-ovtr] Ironically, Wayeaae too had
been moteated aa a child. She told Deairay becauea aha
euepeeted that Dotiray
might have alao been ebuted*
Mre. KRUGER: And even afler telling her my etory,
•he would juit go into a blank,
DESIRAY: I didn't feel thet I ehould live my life
anymore bacauae it waa over. There waa nothing left for
WO to do.
Mra- KRUGER: And ehe eaid, «Mom, t want to Mil
mytelf." That wet-~ and I Jutt— t waa betide myaelf. I
mean, I couldn't b«Uave that my 11— I0-yter*old «*- I
think aha waa 10 »t the time — aaid< "I want to kill
myself."
JARRTEL: You really felt life wasn't worth it anymore
bub?
BB8IRAY! It wasn't
JARRIElh- tvoict-auir] She wont into therapy to work
on her problem and eocmed to improve, but when the
neat summer vacation cima around* once again aha wee
to spend time in the home of her godfather, Richard
Streate, who now had moved to thia home in aouthern
California.
&E81RAY: He opened the door and I taw the took on
tde face. I felt like 10 million pounds offarickeJutt hit
me and just fell tight on my ahauldere. And I waa crying
for my dad not to leave, 'ceute I didn't want him to
leave, but I didnt tell him why. And that night, he approached ma and triad to again.
JARRJEU •The aftend thing tgtln?
*
DEBmAYsYe*.
JARRIEL* Attempted. What Hopped him?
DEBIRAY: I had the covert tightly tuCked underneath
me, end I waa totting and turning to he couldn't get In.
JARRIEt* After Ilia aecond time, when bo attempted,
hut didn't reach you, you decide to tptek out. Who did
AX tell flret and what wet the reaction?
EfilRAYt Well, the next morning, I called my blalog!*
eal father and I waa trying. My dad bed alwaya eald
that whatever happeua, hell alweye believe me and Tm

S

lit* tfttU atari, tout tl»«t'« oat i k * ««tioa t h a t H* toek.

JARRtELt You told him the man he trotted—hie beat
friend, your godfather—had attempted to molttt you.
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DEfilRAYt I c*n **y apadAcally what ha told n
that waa that he doesn't believe me becauea ha t}
wet making it up for the Attention.
Mre. KRUOERi And Z waa trying to calm her
"Deetrayf whet happened?* And ehe got really e
mean, her taart etopptd. 8ha Jutt got eilent. And
"Did eomabodv hurt your And tlio mumbled
And the flret thing after that, I taid, «Did Richart
you?-1 knew i t 1 knew It I could jutt— I felt It Ir
part of my aoul that theft what hepptned. I ma
etything came back to ma And aha aald yet,
JARRXBLc fvoict-avmr] Wayanna had Anally diac
the eauae of Desirey'e year-long dtprcaalon. To,
fluy decided to go to the police, If it had happ*
Etalray, it had happened to ethen, and th<
Richard Streete needed to be etopped.
ton *am*ra] Here In 8imi Valley, the little girl
plaint reached the deak of aharilfa invettigatora
effort to get more evidence, they had Deeiray
Streete and confamt him about the ebuee while t
corded the eonvertaticn, however, thia ploy didn1
In e 45-minute cell, Btreate admitted nothings I
have ended there, but nine month* later there i
other development which finally broke the cat
open •* when another girl> egad 10, come for\
complain eht too hid bean molettad repeatedly
thret«year period by Street*.
A*io*iOi*rJ In a detailed report to tha eutl
aha complained Streete •repeatedly fbndled her
end vaginal area with hie handed Now, with to
plainta againtt him, Btreate contacted* Detect!
Lewie, who worked on the invettigation* belie
aocond little girl would have naver coma forwr
Detirey not flret paved tha way*
Dot SUfiAN L&WI8, Bimi Valley SKerifft
She haa a real aenea of whafr right and even t
explained to her at the time that oho wee gait
going through a eeriee of interviews that the m
to be going to court, aha could poaaibly be ai
court on the witneea etend in front of the ptrpct
the courtroom, ehe waa undaunted by that
JARRIELt [ucUn-cxvr] Deteaitva I-ewie aeye h
eeee over 2,000 eex abuae eomplainta a year*
than half ever reach the eourte beoauaa tha thil
too afraid to apeak up- And not only <ttd Detlrt
Up, aha opoke out, itllowing the eourte and tha
revttl her identity. Thue ehe hiuke tha tradltif
paranta and children follow to hide their ld<
ovoid the etigme of hiving bean abueed.
DBBIRAYi
f felt th*t I had to do that for the ot
dren, acauae I know that there were tone jutt
that art out there (hit weren't talking. , „ m
Mnu KRUOER) I never know another child
done i t She would chtngo the world* She'd be
child, the flrtt girl itj the nation that t W
would eey, 1 wee moleatad and thlt U my real
with a vengeance. She wrote an Icnpweionca
top feminiat lawyer, Oierie Allrtd, end won h«
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thiee and her earviote* and on January 18, IMS, the
ceic went to criminal court. It wee tha firat time
Dottray had aoon Richard 8trtata etnce tha abuaa. Me.
Allred read for u* the atatetaent aha mada in oourt that
GLORIA ALLRED. Attorney: I t U night. It la dark.
There la ellaaoa. Tha child la aleerplng. Suddenly, there
la a large m*n by har badaida. Ha laana ovar h«r. What
la mora vulnerable than a eleaping ehild? Ha pleeae hia
Angara inaida of her. Ha tnovaa tbam around, not juet
onca but continually fbr 10 mlnutea. tt waa 10 mlnutea
of horror in tha dark and In aUanea« inflicted by a man
much bigger than a 10«yaar«1d girl Aad I aak tha court
to look at thia through tha eyea of a ahfld.*
DRfilRAYt «I hata htm for touching me* 1 hata him
for what ha hat dona to my life. 1 will navar forgive
him and t will nevar forget what ha haa dona In ma."
JUDGE: Defendant ia ecuteneed to tha low tarm of
thraa yeara In atate orlaon.
JARRIELs /uoka^wr/Richard Streate got throe yeara
end Dtalray had had her day In criminal court, but aha
v*kBn\ flnlahed. In what'a believed to be an uopreoo*
* dented legal,move by a yDung*tar, aha attacked Streate
tluough a civil lawsuit, aaeking corapeneaticu for tha
phycieai and emotional damages aha had auffaredi
DEBIRAY; I knew that you have to do eomethlog big to
gat eomewhera in life, and what I would like to gee aiming through thia lawiult ia mora klde coming forward
about tt. And I want them to know they can do thia.
Me, AXXRKth Defray la a pioneer* +**y ceurageeuc.
Generally* children have bean thought to he people who
ahould ba In hiding about tha abuaa that they euffar, to
be aahamed, and that la what Deoirey haa turned up*
aide down. She haa Indicated that aha doean't ftil
aahamed. Why ahould ehc? She ia not tha wrtngdeer,
ehc'a not tha perpett ator. She ia the Innocent victim.
JARRIEL: fuofetouer/ And thatfe a big part of the inee*
aaga Daalra/a trying to apraad to childran all ovar the
teunUy. To help her, aha and her mom have atarted an
organisation called OARAM — Childran Ageinet Eapa
and MoleataUen. She writaa a newsletter that'e die*
tributad to victlma1 rlghtg orgenleatiotie and police etatlona to let children of abuaa know they are not atone*
Her tnaflbo* haa been filled with lattara from abuaad
children who, for the firat time, have eomeoue to turn
to.
DEfilRAY: "When I waa Rule, I wee malaeted by a family member about two yeara ago. I told aomaona about
It. Sometime* 1 fool lika that paraon ia going to hurt
me."
JARRIEL: Thia ia a complicated problem for a lot of
klde* What advice do you tell them?
DESIRAYt Weil, if thay have already bean through tha
abuaa, I tell them that I think they ahould Ala a pallca
report and X think that if no one Helena to them, they
ehould Veep on telling until aomaona will lieteu to them.
J I U J WEBB, *VI*i»4t ft sot to * aoint where f wee
treedy to give up* but than Daelray came along and It
t&gnged my tnind anJ made mt want to go on.
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JARRIELt [voicw-ovrr) Oloaar to home, Jill W&h '
friend of Daaira/e from ochool. It waa only, after
heard about Dcalray going public thai eh« too deeid*
talk about har own abuaa.
(intirvUwing) When you were moieeted* did
have aemawhara to turn? Did you have eottueni
apeak to about lit
JILL: No. 1 waa ao ecared that he might hurt ma or
of my family that I juat kept it lueide and had nnwl
to go.
JARRXELt Kava yon bean allocked, have you been
priaed to loam that you're not alone, even though
felt terribly alone in tiying to deal with thief
DESIRAYt X wee eurprUed, hut 1 waent ehocke
mean, the etatictlee are juat honifie, and there *r
many klde that out there being ehueed and they i
help*
"Dec* Dectray* 1 bet you feal the aame way m i
eanvt believe my grandpa did tide to ma. I with 1
punch him for the naaty thlnge he did*
•HI, Deairay. I waa actually abueed when I wi
yaare old. It wae by my habyirftUr'e hueband."
•Daar Deeirgy, Vm proud of you. I feel like you 1
and understand.*
•Hear Dcairay, I waa

i

andl<friendi and alitor.*l,
Deelrcy^lleveyau•
S a t UEWIfl: I think children need to be cmpo*
Thay need to tell anyone who will ltaton about i
happanlng. And in Deelroy'o caeei aha did that as
waa Ketened to and 1 think that'a worked out
good for her.
JARRIEL: tuoie*wtr) And juet thie month! Dai
lawautt waa aettlad in California civil court. The
ruled in Deeiray'e favor, awarding her ever $& mil
demagee, Richard Btreau wae not preeeut i
courtroom, but through hia attorney he wanted it
on tha record that he too waa a victim and hat
eeruaily abuaad aa a child. For Deeiray, thia las
legal deeiaion marked tha and of a very difficult
one in which aha loot her childhood* but found to
voice for abueed childran everywhere,
REPORTER; Deiiray. how are you (Seeling
now?
tlEaiRAYt Happy.
WALTCR8; Of ogurie, aha probahly will navar get
million. He doesn't have that kind of money.
JARRIEL: No, he doeen* have it. Ifo a victory on
pie, primarily;
WALTER* But doea Deairay feel, then, that all t
ahould be open about it?
JARRIEL: Barbara, it'e an Individual dedaion i
knowa it ta» bacauee it aan be eo damaging to a
come out and do thia publicly. It ia aomethlng aa
haa to ehoeae individually with their parents
WALTERS: Haa It bean at all damaging to Doilraj
JJlKltmLi Oh, eke haa *o«a through a Unibl« •*}
in nor ediool, 0>r •xatt%|4ei tb# kt«l* •#tr#^«#^ •*.»
her.
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WALTERS: Realty*
JARRIEL: They chaaad her koma in a threatening feah*
ion. Bha had to take lioma ctudieo and drop out of public
school becauaa thay know thai aha had boon involved In
thla.
WALTERS. Critfcieing her*
JARRIEL: And they a ecu at d her of loading him an and
neety thing* Ilka that that wort eo untrue.
WALTERS: And what about hor relation thlp with htf fa*
thcr?
JARRIEL: Itfo boon broken fcr over a year. Remember, tt
WM hie host friend and ho oidod with tho godfather at ant
point, oo it*# a very, very difficult eltuettan.
WALTERS; So it waa very bravo of bor to do thie.
JARRIEL: Definitely.
DOWNS: Well* next an tha program, a Ufeaeving offbrt like
youVa never eeen before —
[vaic+avtr] —a medical teem thot Joint force* to give
ihlc infant a now heart Ill taka you on o aaarch for a
dauor and Into tha operating room with a worid»famaue
treneplant eurgeon. Yuuli witneit joy and enguleh and an
amot ing anding.
tCanuntroial bnakj

A Gift Prom the Heart
HUGH DOWNS: Tm about to taka you on a remarkable
medical journey to civi a newborn boy. It'e an odyeeey
iVaught with tick and amotion and perhep* controversy
over how far we chould go to aavo an infanta life. Tonight
you'll ba part of tha incredible preoeee of heart tranaplent
aurgcry. and youll experience a family1* A&Kiaty, tha
urgent aoaroh for a donor and the wonder of thit very
predve procodura.
(u6t<*+»er] And for the flrtt time, yotfll witneee the
transfer oflifa from One child to another.
The birth of Auatln PaUraan leet Auguet *rd — the
baginning of a voynga bla parent* Dominica and Kant
know will be a rough one.
KENT PETERSEN. Father: It'e Daddy, eon. What era
thqr doing to you?
DOWNS: (voia+ovtrj Their acin haa a condition that'e
almoat always fatal. It waa (bur xnontha before that tha
Peteraone bad Aral learned eomcthing wae wrong with
their baby at a routine office visit
DOMINICA PETERSEN, Mather: We had the
aonogram at, X think, 1:80 and at 9 o'clock, they eallcd
me at home and aaid. "We only aee three chambera In
the heart* And thet'e when they dropped the bomb, ha*
alcelly, and we ware pretty nervoue;
DOWNS: [vcice-ovsr) A few daye later, doetara eonfirmed the worat A large part of the right elde of
Auittn'o heart waa virtually aoaexletent, a condition
known aa hypoplastic right heart
tyndroue.
Mre, PETERSEN; Wa oouldnft have abortion beeauea
we had watched him to many timet on tha monitora of
tV« aatt*gr*t» •«* l.« w u ao *K</« that w« Juat aaitl*»'t
do enythtof Ilk* thai, fia wa w«r« J»«* coins *• ****
him and take It one day at a time.
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DOWNS! fu&icM+autr] But the Petaraana did tuv
reaJlatto alternative — to give their child a
treniplent — ao they eame here to U m i Linda a
chief of eurgery, Dr. Leonard Builay.
ton comeroj Thie U\ one of ilia aurgiea! auitaa <
Lome Unda Univeriity Medical
Center* abou
houre aait of Loa Angiloe. Itfa hare ovor tha paat at
yeare that Dr. Bailey and hie Uem have been pcrf
tha art of implanting tha working haarta of cb
who have died Into the bodiee of children who w
without thu eurgery. The aurgery U complicate
long and bee often bain done on infante juit hou;
And in many caeaa, tha heart* Dr. Bailey work;
are really tiny, weighing no more than a rcgul
velopek and although tha aurgery la ltfeeeviug,
alao at ttmaa bean controversial
RITA FLYNNt Nawecaet**i It haa never baa
before* not eueeeieAilly aivd not an a patl
email,
DOWNS: (uoioB'OiUttr) Tha announcement th
Bailay had trenaplanted the heart of baby baboot
dying child made headlinee back in 1984, "Bab
aa aha became known, died after SO daye. but n
the tranaplant — aha had other complication* B alley, it waa worth It
D A LEONARD BAILEY, I^raa Linda Uni
Medical Centen She eort of announced to th
that, "Hty, look out. babies need trentplante, tc
notice, folke, and baliy organa can bo ue*L*
DOWNSi (Miaow)
So a year later! he did 1
transplant Thle time, he pui a human heart lni
bom baby- Eddie Aguirre wae the patient. T
eight years ago. Tbia ie Eddie today, tha oldexi
tng infant heart treoenlant patient Becauee h
euch poor modleal condition before the trample
problem* linger today. Kia coordination ie poo?
h u problema with epeech* but with a little p>
from hla mom, ba can tell you what Bailey did t
H n , MARIA AQIJ1RM, Moihert lie took
bad heart and then what elee did ho do?
EDDIE AGUIRUEi Heart IVatuplant Burv
anewoneln<
DOWNS: Put a new one in.
Mre« AOUERREi Put a new ana in and you
now.
DOWNS: Pretty good. Not too many get to
placement like t W f eo that doea make you ^ e
rvQic*+ver) Eddie wag Juet tha ftret In the
eight yeare. there were m*ny more tablet i
bcArti, and thie plcturo telle it aU. There are
to 116 lufanta with a laoond chance. And whi)
tare wait 9for heerta, more babiea ere bom ^
defeete. It a aettmatad that thouaande of bable
with undardevclt^pod or badly developed h<
year* WhUa acme can ba cured witli co
eurgery. othere wlU died without a tranipUt
aide af young Braadeu'a heart ie draatloallsr
and ha*e been waiting for a heart for two mon
Pr< BAILEYt Thie baby baa abaolutely no bo
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